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Introduction 
The 1980s began with Iraq recognized as being one of the most promising countries in the Middle East 
and in the developing world. It was a donor country as well as a significant international creditor. The 
central bank held approximately $36 billion in foreign assets (Jiyad, 2001, p.15). Per capita income was 
around $4000 and, with a growing middle class and the start of a modern industrial sector, the country 
was poised for take-off to high-sustained growth. A plausible scenario at the time would have anticipated 
the country having a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of close to $400 billion, with a per capita income of 
$15,000, self sufficient in food, and an exporter of a wide variety of industrial products.  
Instead, Iraq sealed its demise in 1980 with its invasion of Iran. Two wars and a decade of sanctions later, 
GDP is not $400 billion but $30 billion—per capita income is $2000 at best. Industry has ceased to exist 
and unemployment is optimistically estimated to be around 50%. The agricultural sector is in complete 
disarray, leaving more than 60% of the population dependent on handouts from the United Nations' Oil-
for-Food program. Approximately 40% of the nation's children are suffering from malnutrition. Even before 
the 2003 conflict, clean drinking water was increasingly scarce, with electricity generation having difficulty 
meeting the reduced needs of an impoverished nation. There is no banking system and, for the time 
being, there is not even a national currency. Perhaps even worse, the country's citizens are burdened 
with massive foreign obligations accrued largely by Saddam Hussein. These include foreign debts, war 
reparations, and outstanding contractual arrangements.  
This Strategic Insight examines Iraq's fiscal challenges and possible financial strategies over the next 
decade or so. What options are available under UN Resolution 1483 of May 23, 2003, as well as the 
resolutions coming out of the May 2003 G-8 Finance Ministers' meetings? Which strategies seem best 
from the perspective of Iraq's reconstruction? Under reasonable assumptions, will there be enough 
money to reconstruct the economy and revitalize the oil industry?  
The Debt Trap 
The exact level of Iraq's debt is controversial. A generally accepted figure is $383 billion (Barton and 
Crocker, 2003): $127 billion in loans, including $47 billion in accrued interest; $199 billion in reparations 
and $57 billion in contractual obligations. Assuming the Arab Monetary Fund's (2002) population estimate 
of 22.81 million, this translates into a per capita debt of around $16,790. In perspective, this is about 10 
times as great as Argentina's at the time of that country's economic meltdown in 2001. As another basis 
of comparison Germany's World War I reparations totaled about twice its gross domestic product (GDP). 
These debts were never paid in full; they proved to be an impossible burden. Iraq's debts amount to 
around 15 times its annual GDP (Francis, 2003). Iraq did not make any attempts at servicing the debt in 
the 1990s, but even if it had, its entire annual oil revenues during this period would not have met the 
yearly interest charges. Simply put, the country is bankrupt. 
In short, not only is the country staggering under one of the world's highest debt burdens, but the situation 
is even worse because a significant proportion of loans made no contribution to the country's debt 
servicing capability. They were contracted for purely military or defense related purposes: $37 billion is in 
loans from the Gulf States ($17 billion from Kuwait alone) for support during the 1980-88 war with Iran. 
France is owed $4 billion much of it to pay for F1 fighters and Exocet air-to-surface missiles, and $9 billion 
is owed to Russia for purchases of MIG fighters and helicopters.  
Many observers feel that unless Iraq is relieved of its debt burden in one way or another there will not be 
sufficient funds for any sort of meaningful reconstruction of that country's economy, together with 
restoration of the vital oil sector. An optimistic estimate of the country's likely oil revenues over the next 
decade or so is $22 billion per year, with a pessimistic forecast coming in at around $15 billion. Of this, 
around $11-$13 billion will be needed just to run the government and revitalize the oil industry. Restoring 
and revitalizing the oil industry through reconstructing its infrastructure and the development of new fields 
may run another $35 billion over the next 10 years (Powell, 2002; Alansrawi, 2001). 
Even if all the $22 billion were earmarked for debt servicing, the total amount of outstanding debt would 
be reduced by only around 5% per year. Accrued and on-going interest payments might reduce this figure 
to 1% or 2%. Even if 50% of Iraq's anticipated future export income is diverted to meet debt repayment, it 
would take more than 35 years to pay off current obligations (Mitchell, 2003). In short, as it is currently 
structured, the country's debt is simply not serviceable.  
Similarly, even if war reparations claims were dismissed, Iraq would still have $117 of foreign debt 
obligations. IMF and World Bank Guidelines suggest that debt for the very poorest countries should be no 
more than 150% of exports. With its GDP of $30 billion, Iraq could sustain a debt of perhaps around $21 
billion (Guyon, 2003). Even here, there would be very little left over for reconstruction or repair of the oil 
industry which generates the country's debt servicing capacity in the first place.  
Iraq's debts are among the postwar issues that continue to divide the United States from countries that 
opposed the U.S. led invasion. France, Germany and Russia, which led the anti-war camp, are owed a 
large portion of the debts run up during Saddam Hussein's rule. They have balked at U.S. proposals for 
debt forgiveness, but have said they would be open to relief in the form of delayed and stretched-out 
payments.  
A Framework for the Future 
For the next several years at least, Iraq's debt situation will no doubt be greatly affected by the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1483 of May 23, 2003. While dealing with a broad 
range of issues, the Resolution has particular importance for the future development of the Iraqi economy 
and resources available for that country. In this regard, the Resolution (BBC, 2003): 
Ends 13 years of sanctions. Sanctions had been imposed to compel Saddam Hussein's compliance with 
WMD requirements and contain the threat of his regime. By lifting these outdated sanctions, leaving in 
place only the weapons ban, the resolution should greatly assist in the economy's recovery and economic 
transformation. 
Enables Iraq to rejoin the global market. By abolishing trade restrictions, the resolution will permit Iraq to 
trade freely in the international market. 
Returns oil revenues to Iraq. Oil revenues from export sales will be deposited in the Development Fund 
for Iraq, housed in the Central Bank of Iraq. The development Fund will be monitored by an international 
board that includes representatives of the UN Secretary General, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, and the World Bank. Independent public accountants 
reporting to the board will audit the fund to ensure full transactional transparency. 
Ensures Iraqi revenues are spent on Iraqi reconstruction. The resolution underlines that the Development 
Fund will be used in a transparent manner: for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, economic 
reconstruction, and repair of Iraq's infrastructure, and the costs of Iraqi civilian administration. 
Temporarily immunizes oil sales. To ensure that Iraqis have access to the critical resources needed for 
reconstruction during the transition period, oil sales will be immunized against attachment by international 
creditors or others with claims against the former regime until December 31, 2007. Clearly laying legal 
claim to Iraqi oil revenues had seemed the likeliest way for creditors to get some money back. At the very 
least, this wording would give Iraq a strong hand in any formal Paris and London Club debt renegotiations. 
It might even allow it to repudiate its oil debt and still raise fresh capital. 
Terminates the Oil-for-Food (OFF) program in six months. The resolution allows the Secretary General, in 
coordination with coalition authorities and the Iraqi Interim Administration, to continue to prioritize 
contracts previously approved and funded by the UN for delivery to meet the immediate needs of the Iraqi 
people. Action on contracts judged to be of questionable usefulness in light of the changed circumstances 
will be postponed until an internationally recognized representative government is established and in a 
position to make its own determination. One billion dollars of unallocated funds in the UN escrow account 
will be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq to provide for immediate reconstruction needs. 
Provides for Compensation. There will be continued funding of the UN Compensation Commission, which 
deals with outstanding claims for victims of Saddam's aggression in Kuwait. Five percent of oil proceeds 
are to be deposited into the UNCC Compensation Fund. This is down from 25 percent under the Oil-for-
Food program. 
Basically, the Resolution grants broad power to the United States and Britain to manage Iraq for at least a 
year. For the economy and the country's debt burden, the resolution buys some breathing space. The 
resolution opens the way for putting the oil sector back on its feet and back generating the revenues the 
country needs. Because all proceeds from the sale of oil will flow into the newly formed Development 
Fund, its administrators (after allocating 5% for Kuwaiti claims) will have to grapple simultaneously with 
four competing claims on their funds—humanitarian needs, reconstruction, revitalization of the oil sector, 
and debt servicing.  
The G-8 Resolutions of May 2003 
At their mid-May 2003 meeting in Deauville on the Normandy coast, the G-8 finance ministers also 
addressed Iraq debt problems. The resolutions coming out of this meeting called for the Paris Club of 
creditor nations to overhaul its rules for negotiating financial relief for countries like Iraq that are heavily 
indebted, but do not qualify for the special assistance available to the poorest states—the HIPC initiative. 
The Paris Club's 19 members which include most of the advanced industrial countries are believed to be 
owed an estimated $26 billion. But that is only the principal. Most of the debt dates from the 1970s and 
has been accruing unpaid interest since then.  
The move should lead to the Paris Club offering debt-relief measures tailored more to the individual 
needs of countries. There is also the possibility the new initiative would put pressure on creditors to write 
off some debts in exceptional cases. Still, the process of tackling Iraq's debt burden looks certain to be 
complex and protracted. Although some G-8 officials said that the Paris Club initiative should lead to debt 
restructuring and write-offs for Iraq, others questioned that this will necessarily be the case. In a related 
action, the G-8 Finance Ministers countries resolved not to attempt to secure any repayment on Iraqi 
debts for at least another year.  
Unfortunately, despite these promising signs, the debt issue is likely to become increasingly contentious 
as the United States pushes for write-offs of large parts of Iraq's liabilities. One senses wide-spread 
reluctance or disinterest on the parts of many other countries and institutions (Mitchell, 2003): 
1. In April 2003 after initial reluctance, the World bank and the IMF agreed to play the normal role in 
Iraq's redevelopment "at the appropriate time." They are sending a fact-finding mission to the 
country.  
2. Also in April, Horst Kohler, Managing director of the IMF, said it was "premature to speak about 
debt forgiveness, which should be a matter for Iraq's creditors to discuss."  
3. Some of Iraq's bilateral creditors appear inclined to oppose debt cancellation. In the case of 
Russia and Germany, for instance, Mr. Putin and Chancellor Schroder initially said that they 
would contemplate a write-off of some of Iraq's debt, but the Russian finance minister, Alexi 
Kudrin, has since declared that Russia does not have a policy of debt forgiveness, and 
Germany's finance minister Hans Eichel has categorically announced his intention of recovering 
the $4 billion owed to his government (Financial Times, April 14, 2003).  
Strategies for Reducing Foreign Obligations 
Realistically despite the resistance of Iraq's major creditors, the country's debt will have to be: (a) 
forgiven—in all or part, an application of the odious debt doctrine; (b) radically restructured to string it out 
over many years after an initial moratorium period on servicing; or (c) eased by eclectic solutions—
contract cancellation, debt equity swaps, partial privatizations, etc. (IMF, 2003). The United States and 
UK as occupying powers will have, within the context of Iraq's reconstruction, considerable influence over 
the path and direction of Iraq's debt resolution. In this regard, Secretary Rumsfield (2003) has laid out 
some general guidelines with regard to financial assistance and other economic issues:  
Favor Market Economy. Decisions will favor market systems, not Stalinist command systems, and 
activities that will begin to diversify the Iraqi economy beyond oil. The coalition will encourage moves to 
privatize state-owned enterprises. 
Oil. The Coalition Provisional Authority will develop a plan for the Iraqi oil industry based on transparency. 
Iraq's oil wealth will be used and marketed for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 
Priority Sources of Funds. In assisting the Iraqi people, the United States will play its role but should not 
be considered the funder of first and last resort. The American people have already made a significant 
investment to liberate Iraq, and stand ready to contribute to rebuilding efforts. But when funds are needed, 
before turning to the U.S. taxpayers, the coalition will turn first to Iraqi regime funds located in Iraq; Iraqi 
funds in the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program; seized frozen Iraqi regime assets in the United States and other 
countries; and international donors across the globe. 
Conventional Debt Forgiveness 
The case for debt forgiveness has gained increased credence in recent years. After many years of 
agonizing over developing country debt, the international financial community finally recognized in 1996 
that the external debt situation of a number of low-income countries, mostly in Africa, had become dire, 
jeopardizing any prospects for future growth and development. For these countries, even full use of 
traditional mechanisms of rescheduling and debt reduction, together with continued provision of 
concessional financing and pursuit of sound economic policies might not be sufficient to attain sustainable 
external debt levels within a reasonable period of time and without additional external support. A group of 
41 countries were deemed in such a situation and considered candidates for the new Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative.  
The HIPC initiative was launched in September 1999, although Iraq was not included in the group. To be 
eligible for special assistance under the program a country has to meet certain criteria: (1) be eligible only 
for concessional assistance from the IMF and World Bank; (2) face an unsustainable debt burden, 
beyond available debt-relief mechanism such as Naples terms (where low-income countries can receive a 
reduction of eligible external debt of 67% in net present value [NPV]); and (3) establish a track record of 
reform and sound policies through IMF and World Bank supported programs. 
For Iraq to become eligible at this point, the country would have to complete a successful first phase. This 
would entail a three-year period of successfully adopting adjustment and reform programs supported by 
the IMF and World Bank. During that time, the country could receive debt relief from Paris Club creditors 
and other official bilateral and private creditors, as well as traditional concessional assistance from donors 
and multilateral institutions. 
The HIPC route might seem a logical solution for Iraq once the country is back on its feet and ready to 
move ahead with reforms and a reorganization of the economy. Unfortunately, because it may take Iraq 
several years to reach this stage, HIPC is not a realistic near-term option for the country's policymakers.  
Odious Debt 
One radical option is for Iraq to repudiate all of its international debt. This action would be based on 
making the case that Saddam government was an odious regime. Michael Kremer of Harvard University, 
for example, argues that after a change of regime, a country's new government should have no legal 
obligation to service the odious debt of an illegitimate predecessor. The odious doctrine is an idea dating 
back to the Spanish-American war of 1898. In theory, establishing the right of a country such as Iraq to 
write off odious debt would have potentially huge benefits, not the least by discouraging banks from 
lending to similar tyrants that might one day be overthrown. Indeed, setting out precise rules for what 
counts as odious regime and thereby making it harder for such regimes to borrow may be a better form of 
economic sanction than the traditional approach of obstructing trade. Restrictions on trade hurt ordinary 
people, whereas making it harder to borrow hurts those in charge. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, a worldwide campaign called Jubilee 2000 attempted to call attention to the 
concept of odious debt. Unfortunately, the doctrine of odious debt has gained little momentum in 
international law (Kremer and Jayachandran, 2003). As might be imagined, most western governments 
and bankers have shown little enthusiasm for the odious debt doctrine. "They'd prefer not be in the 
business of judging whether a regime is illegitimate. They also like to get paid back. And no one wants 
countries to renege every time a general stages a coup." (Surowiecki, 2003). 
Some commentators have gone so far as to argue that increased use of the odious debt doctrine could 
destabilize the global credit markets by making creditors fearful that other countries might one day 
describe their debt as odious. Their main point: it is not hard to imagine circumstances in which, say, a 
newly democratic China might try to shed the external debt—$170 billion at the end of 2001—of the 
"odious" undemocratic regime it replaced (James, 2003). 
Lenders to Iraq warn that adopting this policy could do irreparable harm to Iraq's ability to borrow in the 
future. Yet a debt-free, democratic (hopefully) Iraq, with a predictable stream of revenue from oil, should 
be a much more appealing country to lend to than one saddled with up-to $400 billion in debts (Craze, 
2003).  
Interestingly, two of the main arguments against forgiveness hardly apply to Iraq. There is no obvious 
"moral hazard": forgiveness would not reward any bad behavior of a new Iraqi government, nor—given 
the unique circumstances—would it generate expectations that similar generosity would be forthcoming in 
future. As the Economist (May 7, 2003) notes: "Likewise, because a new government would be clearly 
unconnected to the Saddam regime, refusing to repay all its debts might not hinder the government from 
borrowing fresh capital—though it is certainly plausible that creditors might look more kindly on Iraq, and 
thus charge it a lower rate of interest, if it continued to pay existing creditors something, after a formal 
rescheduling." 
Certainly, from Iraq's point of view, the ideal solution is for creditor countries and commercial lenders to 
write off a substantial portion of the debt, perhaps as much as 80% and to allow a moratorium on all 
payments and reparations for five to ten years. The odious debt doctrine would be an ideal way to do this 
and, as noted above, there would not necessarily be a risk penalty attached to the country's future 
borrowing. The United States and other members of the Paris Club creditor group did essentially just that 
for Yugoslavia, another recent odious-type case, after the war in Kosovo in 2001 (Vieth 2003).  
John Snow, newly appointed Secretary of Treasury, has given his tacit blessing to the odious debt 
doctrine: "certainly the people of Iraq shouldn't be saddled with those debts incurred through the regime 
of the dictator who is now gone" (quoted in Beattie, 2003).  
Given its position under resolution 1483 the United States has a lot of leverage in pressuring countries to 
write off their claims on Iraq—prolonged legal wrangling would no doubt mean they would be locked out 
of future lucrative contracts in a country with the world's second largest oil reserves. 
The Issue of Reparations and War-Related Debt 
Contemplating the victorious allies at the Versailles peace conference in 1919, the famous English 
economist John Maynard Keynes observed that "reparation was their main excursion into the economic 
field, and they settled it as a problem of theology, of politics, of electoral chicane, from every point of view 
except that of the economic future of the states whose destiny they were handling" (quoted in Economist, 
May 17, 2003). Keynes rightly foresaw that this neglect would have disastrous consequences. 
Unfortunately, Keynes' wisdom, if even acknowledged, is being largely ignored. Given the country's dire 
straits, the 5% of Iraq's oil revenues to be allocated for this purpose under Resolution 1483, even though 
it is down from 25% under the Oil-for-Food program, is still excessive. 
 
Almost all of the personal claims arising from Iraq's previous wars have been settled. What remains is 
reparations demanded by other countries. These consist mainly of outstanding claims by Kuwait ($17 
billion) , Saudi Arabia ($25 billion) and the other Gulf countries stemming from assistance provided Iraq 
during the Iran/Iraq war in the 1980s. Using the odious debt doctrine noted above, Iraq could easily build 
a good moral and probably legal case that that the population should not be burdened for wars they had 
no say in but were forced to participate in. If these obligations are grants, as the Iraqis claim, then they 
may be a moot point. If they are loans as the Gulf states argue, the situation becomes difficult for 
resolution, in part because any significant increase in Iraqi oil production is likely to drive down world oil 
prices into the low teens, something the Saudis and Kuwaitis do not wish to see. To stabilize the price at 
around $29 a barrel they will have to reduce their own output, while at the same time being asked to 
forgive their neighbor's past debt—something each country is unlikely to agree to readily.  
Outstanding Contracts 
The odious debt doctrine would also seem to apply to the $57 billion in outstanding contracts, mainly to 
Russia, France and China. Many of these claims are for questionable contracts for oil exploration and 
development. As noted, Resolution 1483 sets up a procedure for the evaluation of outstanding contracts. 
However, it is not clear whether the UN will have ultimate authority to approve or disqualify a contract.  
In any case the Iraqis and American administrators are taking matters into their own hands. Just three 
days after the Resolution 1483 was passed, Iraq's oil minister announced that three oil production 
contracts signed by the previous regime with Russian and Chinese companies would be either terminated 
or frozen. Phillip Carroll, the former Shell executive chosen by the Pentagon to advise the oil ministry said 
that there was some doubt whether existing foreign contracts "gave the Iraqi people the full benefit of their 
oil wealth" (Clover May 26, 2003). No doubt, some of the outstanding contracts will meet Carroll's criteria 
for approval—20% would seem to be a safe bet. 
As in the case above, long litigation by the Russians, French and Chinese would probably result in them 
being completely frozen out of future reconstruction and development projects in Iraq. The potential 
amounts of future work are enormous. The previous administration had developed a strategic plan to 
increase production capacity from 3 million barrels per day to 6 million in six to seven years at a cost of 
$25-30 billion. Every indication is that this plan will move ahead. 
Bottom Line: Counting the Beans 
The considerations noted above lead to some likely budgetary figures (summarized in Figure 1). For debt 
servicing, it is unlikely all will be written off under the Odious Debt Doctrine. Although ideal from Iraq's 
situation and that of the Middle East as a whole (and despite U.S. efforts) there is sufficient opposition 
amongst the creditors to make this a non-starter. Instead, the Paris Club is likely to work out some sort of 
debt restructuring that will amount to annual payments in the $2-3 billion range.  
Similarly, reparations imposed on Iraq will probably not vary significantly from Resolution 1483's 
mandated 5% of oil revenues—depending on the likely range of oil revenues of $15-$22 billion, this adds 
another budgetary cost of $0.75-$1.25 billion annually.  
While many of the contracts signed by the previous regime are likely to be invalidated, perhaps up to 20% 
will be approved on merit or because of intense political pressure. This would add around another billion 
to the budget. However given the likely cost of oil sector restoration of $35 billion annually, this would only 
reduce the share of other bidders and not be an additional charge to the anticipated $3.5 billion annual 
cost. 
If we assume yearly government functions to run around $11 - $13 billion, a range often tossed out, and 
adding on $10 billion or so for reconstruction over the next ten years, this brings total expenditures annual 
expenditures up the $27.25 - $30.75 billion figure for the next ten or so years. 
With projected oil revenues in the $15 - $22 billion range this leaves an annual shortfall of between $5.25 
billion - $15.75 billion. 
Conclusions 
The reality is that Iraq is bankrupt and even under fairly optimistic debt restructuring and oil revenue 
assumptions will simply not have the resources to implement a successful reconstruction and recovery 
program. While the country would likely be able to thrive under an international aid program as ambitious 
as the Marshall Plan that helped Europe recover from the ravages of World War II, there is no indication 
that donor countries are lining up to provide funds of this magnitude. No doubt significant amounts of aid 
funds, both humanitarian and development will flow into Iraq, but these will be far short of the likely 
budgetary shortfalls associated with the necessary outlays to put Iraq's economy on a steady, self-
sustained growth path. 
However the situation is far from hopeless. There are a number of available options. The key for success 
is for the Iraqi authorities to look at the complete picture with each action evaluated in terms of its 
contribution to the restoration of self-sustained growth within a reasonable period of time—10 years or so. 
This strategy would include debt servicing alternatives, reconstruction costs, economic reforms (Clover, 
May 27, 2003), industrial diversification and so on. Within this context a number of initiatives might be 
explored by a new Iraqi government. 
1. Debt Servicing Priorities. Link debt payment priorities so that they are proportional with the 
amount of new investment. Countries that are willing to loan/invest new funds in Iraq would 
receive priority on the servicing of their debts. An unambiguous formula could be worked out so 
that each country would know where it stood in terms of receiving speedy compensation for past 
loans. The idea is to provide a tangible inducement to countries to actively participate in Iraq's 
economic recovery.  
2. Debt Forgiveness Incentives. Donor countries might set up a formula linking debt forgiveness to 
Iraq's economic performance. For example, each percent average annual increase in non-oil 
output might be linked to a certain percent of the country's debt forgiven. This would provide Iraqi 
authorities with a real incentive to diversify the economy away from oil through economic reforms, 
privatization schemes, and supportive governmental budgets whose capital allocations went to 
projects with quick payoffs.  
3. Creative Debt Conversions. No doubt, many countries are concerned with the environmental 
damage done under the previous regime. To speed up cleanup and restoration many might find 
debt conversion schemes similar to the highly successful debt for nature plans developed after 
the debt crisis of the 1980s.  
4. Privatization of the Oil Sector. It is somewhat ironic to say that Iraq is bankrupt when it is sitting 
on an asset worth up to $200 billion or so. If the Iraqi authorities are serious about reconstruction, 
they will eventually have to come to grips with the reality that privatization of the oil industry, 
either partial or full, may be necessary for fiscal reasons. The type of privatization will affect the 
stream of revenues derived from the industry. Full privatization of producing reserves might bring 
in $100 billion early on (Adelman, 2003), but would diminish revenues in later time periods. One 
advantage of this option is that it would relieve the government of the cost of restoring and 
renovating the oil industry. As noted above this might come to around $35 billion. Partial 
privatization or selling off exploration rights in non-producing areas might bring in $50 billion, 
enough to cover projected budgetary shortfalls, while maintaining the Iraqi government's longer-
term revenues at a much higher level.  
5. Creation of an Oil Fund. Privatization of the oil sector should be done in a manner similar to that 
introduced in Alaska (Pardee, 2003) whereby a certain proportion of payments/royalties are 
placed in a fund earmarked for direct payment to Iraqis. This would not only make the sector's 
privatization more palatable, but it would also help create the purchasing power necessary to 
support the country's industrial diversification efforts.  
Given the country's likely fiscal position over the next decade, how well a new Iraqi government handles 
technical and political challenges associated with the privatization of the oil sector will no doubt ultimately 
determine if Iraq will soon rejoin the ranks of the world's prosperous countries. 
 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources  
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